Corporate governance and acquirer returns

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Masulis, Ronald W.; Wang, Cong; Xie, Fei
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University; Chinese University of Hong Kong; George Mason University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01259.x
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1851-1889
• 关键词: poison pill securities; free cash flow; ANTITAKEOVER STATUTES; capital structure; ceo turnover; AGENCY COSTS; BAD BIDDERS; firm; decisions; MARKET

摘要

We examine whether corporate governance mechanisms, especially the market for corporate control, affect the profitability of firm acquisitions. We find that acquirers with more antitakeover provisions experience significantly lower announcement-period abnormal stock returns. This supports the hypothesis that managers at firms protected by more antitakeover provisions are less subject to the disciplinary power of the market for corporate control and thus are more likely to indulge in empire-building acquisitions that destroy shareholder value. We also find that acquirers operating in more competitive industries or separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the board experience higher abnormal announcement returns.