Bidding into the red: A model of post-auction bankruptcy
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Board, Simon
署名单位：
University of Toronto
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1082
DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01290.x
发表日期：
2007
页码：
2695-2723
关键词：
摘要：
This paper investigates auctions where bidders have limited liability. First, we analyze bidding behavior under different auction formats, showing that the second-price auction induces higher prices, higher bankruptcy rates, and lower utilities than the first-price auction. Second, we show that the cost of bankruptcy critically affects the seller's preference over the choice of auction. If bankruptcy is very costly, the seller prefers the first-price auction over the second-price auction. Alternatively, if the bankrupt assets are resold among the losers of the initial auction, the seller prefers the second-price auction.