How are firms sold?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boone, Audra L.; Mulherin, J. Harold
• 署名单位: University of Kansas; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01225.x
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 847-875
• 关键词: REVISITING AUCTIONS; tender offers; sunk costs; takeover; mergers; IMPACT; returns; WEALTH; bids; CEOS

摘要

As measured by the number of bidders that publicly attempt to acquire a target, the takeover arena in the 1990s appears noncompetitive. However, we provide novel data on the pre-public, private takeover process that indicates that public takeover activity is only the tip of the iceberg of actual takeover competition during the 1990s. We show a highly competitive market where half of the targets are auctioned among multiple bidders, while the remainder negotiate with a single bidder. In event study analysis, we find that the wealth effects for target shareholders are comparable in auctions and negotiations.