SANCTIONING IN THE WILD: RATIONAL CALCULUS AND RETRIBUTIVE INSTINCTS IN GOURMET CUISINE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Di Stefano, Giada; King, Andrew A.; Verona, Gianmario
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Dartmouth College; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2012.1192
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 906-931
• 关键词: altruistic punishment; ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES; ANTISOCIAL PUNISHMENT; UNITED-STATES; COOPERATION; RECIPROCITY; weak; IMPACT; field; CONSTRUCTION

摘要

Why do we sanction norm violations? Despite near universal agreement on the role of sanctions for maintaining norms of cooperation, scholars hotly dispute whether individuals sanction based on a rational calculus or because of strong retributive instincts. In this paper we report on a mixed-method field study examining sanctioning behavior. Our goal is to extend theories of sanctioning by evaluating the conditions under which individuals are more likely to administer a sanction in response to a norm violation. To guide the development of our hypotheses, we engage in a qualitative examination of sanctioning decisions in the context of gourmet cuisine. We then test our predictions in a field experiment involving more than 500 gourmet chefs in Italy. Our results suggest that individuals follow retributive instincts, but they also engage in cost-benefit calculations. Indeed, we find that the two logics of sanctioning jointly influence participation in social exchange. Recognizing their own tendency to sanction at a cost, individuals avoid circumstances that could trigger the need for costly sanctions.