Security design with investor private information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Axelson, Ulf
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01287.x
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 2587-2632
• 关键词: COMMON VALUE AUCTIONS; aggregation; allocation; FIRMS

摘要

I study the security design problem of a firm when investors rather than managers have private information about the firm. I find that it is often optimal to issue information-sensitive securities such as equity. The folklore proposition of debt from traditional signaling models only goes through if the firm can vary the face value of debt with investor demand. When the firm has several assets, debt backed by a pool of assets is optimal when the degree of competition among investors is low, while equity backed by individual assets is optimal when competition is high.