Market Structure, Internal Capital Markets, and the Boundaries of the Firm

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mathews, Richmond D.; Robinson, David T.
• 署名单位: Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01395.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 2703-2736
• 关键词: strategic alliances; COMPETITION; OWNERSHIP; RESOURCES; side

摘要

We study how the creation of an internal capital market (ICM) can invite strategic responses in product markets that, in turn, shape firm boundaries. ICMs provide ex post resource flexibility, but come with ex ante commitment costs. Alternatively, stand-alones possess commitment ability but lack flexibility. By creating flexibility, integration can sometimes deter a rival's entry, but commitment problems can also invite predatory capital raising. These forces drive different organizational equilibria depending on the integrator's relation to the product market. Hybrid organizational forms like strategic alliances can sometimes dominate integration by offering some of its benefits with fewer strategic costs.