International cross-listing, firm performance, and top management turnover: A test of the bonding hypothesis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lel, Ugur; Miller, Darius P.
• 署名单位: Southern Methodist University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01377.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1897-1937
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; Investor protection; MARKET-SEGMENTATION; executive turnover; INTERACTION TERMS; UNITED-STATES; ceo turnover; equity; logit; determinants

摘要

We examine a primary outcome of corporate governance, namely, the ability to identify and terminate poorly performing CEOs, to test the effectiveness of U.S. investor protections in improving the corporate governance of cross-listed firms. We find that firms from weak investor protection regimes that are cross-listed on a major U.S. Exchange are more likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs than non-cross-listed firms. Cross-listings on exchanges that do not require the adoption of stringent investor protections (OTC, private placements, and London listings) are not associated with a higher propensity to remove poorly performing CEOs.