The Internal Governance of Firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Acharya, Viral V.; Myers, Stewart C.; Rajan, Raghuram G.
• 署名单位: Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01649.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 689-720
• 关键词: MANAGERIAL; reputation; OWNERSHIP; COSTS; debt

摘要

We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance and improve efficiency. This leads to a theory of investment and dividend policy, in which dividends are paid by self-interested CEOs to maintain a balance between internal and external control.