Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity Prices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Giroud, Xavier; Mueller, Holger M.
• 署名单位: New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01642.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 563-600
• 关键词: SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; cross-section; performance; RISK; COMPENSATION; incentives

摘要

This paper examines whether firms in noncompetitive industries benefit more from good governance than do firms in competitive industries. We find that weak governance firms have lower equity returns, worse operating performance, and lower firm value, but only in noncompetitive industries. When exploring the causes of the inefficiency, we find that weak governance firms have lower labor productivity and higher input costs, and make more value-destroying acquisitions, but, again, only in noncompetitive industries. We also find that weak governance firms in noncompetitive industries are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds, suggesting that investors take actions to mitigate the inefficiency.