A Lintner Model of Payout and Managerial Rents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lambrecht, Bart M.; Myers, Stewart C.
• 署名单位: Lancaster University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01772.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1761-1810
• 关键词: dividend policy; information-content; consumption; INVESTMENT; earnings; AGENCY; income; debt; determinants; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We develop a dynamic agency model in which payout, investment, and financing decisions are made by managers who attempt to maximize the rents they take from the firm, subject to a capital market constraint. Managers smooth payout to smooth their flow of rents. Total payout (dividends plus net repurchases) follows Lintners (1956) target adjustment model. Payout smooths out transitory shocks to current income and adjusts gradually to changes in permanent income. Smoothing is accomplished by borrowing or lending. Payout is not cut back to finance capital investment. Risk aversion causes managers to underinvest, but habit formation mitigates the degree of underinvestment.