CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Guthrie, Katherine; Sokolowsky, Jan; Wan, Kam-Ming
署名单位：
William & Mary; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1082
DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01744.x
发表日期：
2012
页码：
1149-1168
关键词：
摘要：
Chhaochharia and Grinstein estimate that CEO pay decreases 17% more in firms that were not compliant with the recent NYSE/Nasdaq board independence requirement than in firms that were compliant. We document that 74% of this magnitude is attributable to two outliers of 865 sample firms. In addition, we find that the compensation committee independence requirement increases CEO total pay, particularly in the presence of effective shareholder monitoring. Our evidence casts doubt on the effectiveness of independent directors in constraining CEO pay as suggested by the managerial power hypothesis.