THE BENEFITS OF NOT SEEING EYE TO EYE WITH LEADERSHIP: DIVERGENCE IN RISK PREFERENCES IMPACTS MULTITEAM SYSTEM BEHAVIOR AND PERFORMANCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lanaj, Klodiana; Foulk, Trevor A.; Hollenbeck, John R.
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; University of Florida; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Michigan State University
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2015.0946
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1554-1582
• 关键词: DECISION-MAKING GROUPS; TEAM DIVERSITY; UNSHARED INFORMATION; Strategic risk; MEDIATING ROLE; goals; MODEL; COORDINATION; CONGRUENCE; improvement

摘要

Multiteam systems are large structures of interdependent teams that coordinate via planning before embarking on important projects. Although rarely studied, theory suggests that expression of convergent versus divergent goals and preferences during planning by leadership and component teams matters for multiteam system performance. Addressing this important issue, in a sample of multiteam systems consisting of Air Force officers, we examine how convergent versus divergent preferences for risk expressed during planning by the leadership and component teams impact multiteam system behavior and performance during the performance episode. Drawing from literatures on multiteam systems, diversity, and risk we posit and show that divergent (vs. convergent) preferences for risk have positive implications for multiteam system behavior and performance. Specifically, when the leadership and component teams hold divergent risk preferences, multiteam systems engage in more aspirational behavior and perform better. Alternatively, when the leadership and component teams hold convergent risk preferences, multiteam systems perform worse, partially because they display lower aspirational behavior. Consistent with a learning perspective, the beneficial effects of divergent preferences for risk increase over time. We discuss the implications of our findings for research and practice.