When It Pays to Pay Your Investment Banker: New Evidence on the Role of Financial Advisors in M&As

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Golubov, Andrey; Petmezas, Dimitris; Travlos, Nickolaos G.
• 署名单位: City St Georges, University of London; University of Surrey
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01712.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 271-311
• 关键词: free cash flow; information asymmetry; MARKET; reputation; mergers; returns; banking; gains; FIRMS; COMPENSATION

摘要

We provide new evidence on the role of financial advisors in M&As. Contrary to prior studies, top-tier advisors deliver higher bidder returns than their non-top-tier counterparts but in public acquisitions only, where the advisor reputational exposure and required skills set are relatively larger. This translates into a $65.83 million shareholder gain for an average bidder. The improvement comes from top-tier advisors ability to identify more synergistic combinations and to get a larger share of synergies to accrue to bidders. Consistent with the premium pricepremium quality equilibrium, top-tier advisors charge premium fees in these transactions.