Efficient Recapitalization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Philippon, Thomas; Schnabl, Philipp
• 署名单位: New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01793.x
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1-42
• 关键词: FINANCIAL CRISIS; Debt overhang; reorganization; liquidity

摘要

We analyze government interventions to recapitalize a banking sector that restricts lending to firms because of debt overhang. We find that the efficient recapitalization program injects capital against preferred stock plus warrants and conditions implementation on sufficient bank participation. Preferred stock plus warrants reduces opportunistic participation by banks that do not require recapitalization, although conditional implementation limits free riding by banks that benefit from lower credit risk because of other banks participation. Efficient recapitalization is profitable if the benefits of lower aggregate credit risk exceed the cost of implicit transfers to bank debt holders.