Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gorbenko, Alexander S.; Malenko, Andrey
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12194
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 2513-2555
• 关键词: private equity; english auctions; acquisitions; returns; FIRMS; performance; ACQUIRERS; contests; toeholds; targets

摘要

Using data on auctions of companies, we estimate valuations (maximum willingness to pay) of strategic and financial bidders from their bids. We find that a typical target is valued higher by strategic bidders. However, 22.4% of targets in our sample are valued higher by financial bidders. These are mature, poorly performing companies. We also find that (i) valuations of different strategic bidders are more dispersed and (ii) valuations of financial bidders are correlated with aggregate economic conditions. Our results suggest that different targets appeal to different types of bidders, rather than that strategic bidders always value targets more because of synergies.