Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Burkart, Mike; Gromb, Denis; Mueller, Holger M.; Panunzi, Fausto
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics; INSEAD Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12142
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1129-1165
• 关键词: PRIVATE BENEFITS; voting-rights; corporate; mergers; determinants; OWNERSHIP; MARKET; sales; LAW

摘要

This paper examines the role of legal investor protection for the efficiency of the market for corporate control when bidders are financially constrained. In the model, stronger legal investor protection increases bidders' outside funding capacity. However, absent effective bidding competition, this does not improve efficiency, as the bid price, and thus bidders' need for funds, increases one-for-one with the pledgeable income. In contrast, under effective competition for the target, the increased outside funding capacity improves efficiency by making it less likely that more efficient but less wealthy bidders are outbid by less efficient but wealthier rivals.