Agency Conflicts and Cash: Estimates from a Dynamic Model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nikolov, Boris; Whited, Toni M.
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12183
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1883-1921
• 关键词: CAPITAL STRUCTURE DYNAMICS; corporate governance; structural estimation; RISK-MANAGEMENT; INVESTMENT; holdings; debt; reserves; COSTS; US

摘要

Which agency problems affect corporate cash policy? To answer this question, we estimate a dynamic model of finance and investment with three mechanisms that misalign managerial and shareholder incentives: limited managerial ownership of the firm, compensation based on firm size, and managerial perquisite consumption. We find that perquisite consumption critically impacts cash policy. Size-based compensation also matters, but less. Firms with lower blockholder and institutional ownership have higher managerial perquisite consumption, low managerial ownership is a key factor in the secular upward trend in cash holdings, and agency plays little role in small firms' substantial cash holdings.