KEEP YOUR EYE ON THE BALL OR ON THE FIELD? EXPLORING THE PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS OF EXECUTIVE STRATEGIC ATTENTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eklund, John C.; Mannor, Michael J.
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; University of Notre Dame; University of Notre Dame
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2019.0156
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1685-1713
• 关键词: AIDED TEXT ANALYSIS; CONFERENCE CALLS; cognition; management; capabilities; INNOVATION; FIRMS; view; ceo; inertia

摘要

Scholars have highlighted executive attention as a vital organizational resource. However, as prior studies have examined different facets of attention, a theoretical tension has emerged as towhether attention to a broader or narrower set of strategic issues better facilitates firm performance. On the one hand, a narrower breadth of strategic attention limits the risk of managerial cognitive overload. On the other hand, a greater breadth of strategic attention helps managers avoid blind spots and identifymore or better opportunities. We argue that this balance shifts based on the quantity and quality of opportunities available in the market and on firms' recently demonstrated ability to execute against these opportunities effectively and efficiently. Using a novel text-analysis tool thatwe develop, validate, and make available, we find support for our arguments within a randomsample of Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 companies. We find that broader strategic attention is associated with enhanced performance in weaker opportunity environments, with firms using their resources efficiently, or with firms' failure to utilize their capabilities effectively. In supplementary analyses, we also provide new insights into the importance of following attention with subsequent organizational action.