Asymmetric Information about Collateral Values

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stroebel, Johannes
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12288
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1071-1111
• 关键词: real-estate; Trade credit; distance; selection

摘要

empirically analyze credit market outcomes when competing lenders are differentially informed about the expected return from making a loan. I study the residential mortgage market, where property developers often cooperate with vertically integrated mortgage lenders to offer financing to buyers of new homes. I show that these integrated lenders have superior information about the construction quality of individual homes and exploit this information to lend against higher quality collateral, decreasing foreclosures by up to 40%. To compensate for this adverse selection on collateral quality, nonintegrated lenders charge higher interest rates when competing against a better-informed integrated lender.