Collateralization, Bank Loan Rates, and Monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cerqueiro, Geraldo; Ongena, Steven; Roszbach, Kasper
• 署名单位: Universidade Catolica Portuguesa; University of Zurich; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Sveriges Riksbank; University of Groningen
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12214
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1295-1322
• 关键词: LENDING RELATIONSHIPS; BANKRUPTCY AUCTIONS; empirical-evidence; moral hazard; credit; terms; determinants; liquidation; ENFORCEMENT; INVESTMENT

摘要

We show that collateral plays an important role in the design of debt contracts, the provision of credit, and the incentives of lenders tomonitor borrowers. Using a unique data set from a large bank containing timely assessments of collateral values, we find that the bank responded to a legal reform that exogenously reduced collateral values by increasing interest rates, tightening credit limits, and reducing the intensity of its monitoring of borrowers and collateral, spurring borrower delinquency on outstanding claims. We thus explain why banks are senior lenders and quantify the value of claimant priority.