It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pool, Veronika K.; Sialm, Clemens; Stefanescu, Irina
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12411
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1779-1812
• 关键词: portfolio choice; performance; FLOWS; PARTICIPATION; incentives; families; industry; BROKERS; COSTS

摘要

This paper investigates whether mutual fund families acting as service providers in 401(k) plans display favoritism toward their own affiliated funds. Using a hand-collected data set on the menu of investment options offered to plan participants, we show that fund deletions and additions are less sensitive to prior performance for affiliated than unaffiliated funds. We find no evidence that plan participants undo this affiliation bias through their investment choices. Finally, we find that the subsequent performance of poorly performing affiliated funds indicates that this favoritism is not information driven.