Forced Asset Sales and the Concentration of Outstanding Debt: Evidence from the Mortgage Market
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Favara, Giovanni; Giannetti, Mariassunta
署名单位:
Stockholm School of Economics
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
ISSN/ISSBN:
0022-1082
DOI:
10.1111/jofi.12494
发表日期:
2017
页码:
1081-1118
关键词:
bank mergers
house prices
credit
default
Foreclosures
equilibrium
CRISIS
摘要:
We provide evidence that lenders differ in their ex post incentives to internalize price-default externalities associated with the liquidation of collateralized debt. Using the mortgage market as a laboratory, we conjecture that lenders with a large share of outstanding mortgages on their balance sheets internalize the negative spillovers associated with the liquidation of defaulting mortgages and thus are less inclined to foreclose. We provide evidence consistent with our conjecture. Arguably as a consequence, zip codes with a higher concentration of outstanding mortgages experience smaller house prices declines. These results are not driven by unobservable zip code or lender characteristics.