The Politics of Foreclosures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Agarwal, Sumit; Amromin, Gene; Ben-David, Itzhak; Dinc, Serdar
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Newark; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12725
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 2677-2717
• 关键词: Campaign contributions; mortgage; securitization; COMPETITION; money

摘要

The U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee considered many important banking reforms in 2009 to 2010. We show that, during this period, foreclosure starts on delinquent mortgages were delayed in the districts of committee members although there was no difference in delinquency rates between committee and noncommittee districts. In these areas, banks delayed the foreclosure starts by 0.5 months (relative to the 12-month average). The estimated cost of delay to lenders is an order of magnitude greater than the campaign contributions by the political action committees of the largest mortgage servicing banks to the committee members in that period.