The Fed, the Bond Market, and Gradualism in Monetary Policy
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Stein, Jeremy C.; Sunderam, Adi
署名单位:
Harvard University; Harvard University
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
ISSN/ISSBN:
0022-1082
DOI:
10.1111/jofi.12614
发表日期:
2018
页码:
1015-1060
关键词:
transmission
DISCRETION
rules
MODEL
say
摘要:
We develop a model of monetary policy with two key features: the central bank has private information about its long-run target rate and is averse to bond market volatility. In this setting, the central bank gradually impounds changes in its target into the policy rate. Such gradualism represents an attempt to not spook the bond market. However, this effort is partially undone in equilibrium, as markets rationally react more to a given move when the central bank moves more gradually. This time-consistency problem means that society would be better off if the central bank cared less about the bond market.