Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Azar, Jose; Schmalz, Martin C.; Tecu, Isabel
• 署名单位: University of Navarra; IESE Business School; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; European Corporate Governance Institute; Charles River Associates
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12698
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1513-1565
• 关键词: product-market competition; corporate governance; cross-ownership; vertical integration; multimarket contact; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; capital structure; AIRLINE; performance; CONDUCT

摘要

Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of large institutional investors. In the U.S. airline industry, taking common ownership into account implies increases in market concentration that are 10 times larger than what is presumed likely to enhance market power by antitrust authorities. Within-route changes in common ownership concentration robustly correlate with route-level changes in ticket prices, even when we only use variation in ownership due to the combination of two large asset managers. We conclude that a hidden social cost-reduced product market competition-accompanies the private benefits of diversification and good governance.