Portfolio Manager Compensation in the US Mutual Fund Industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ma, Linlin; Tang, Yuehua; Gomez, Juan-Pedro
• 署名单位: Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen); Peking University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; IE University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12749
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 587-638
• 关键词: Moral hazard; incentive contracts; ADVISORY CONTRACTS; Asset management; Board structure; cross-section; risk-taking; performance; OWNERSHIP; COSTS

摘要

We study compensation contracts of individual portfolio managers using hand-collected data of over 4,500 U.S. mutual funds. Variations in the compensation structures are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium. The likelihood of explicit performance-based incentives is positively correlated with the intensity of agency conflicts, as proxied by the advisor's clientele dispersion, its affiliations in the financial industry, and its ownership structure. Investor sophistication and the threat of dismissal in outsourced funds serve as substitutes for explicit performance-based incentives. Finally, we find little evidence of differences in future performance associated with any particular compensation arrangement.