AVOIDANCE AND AGGRESSION IN STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT: THE IMPACT OF CEO PARANOIA AND PARANOIA-RELEVANT CUES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ridge, Jason W.; Hill, Aaron D.; Ingram, Amy; Kolomeitsev, Sergei; Worrell, Dan L.
• 署名单位: University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Clemson University; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2021.1432
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1392-1415
• 关键词: AIDED TEXT ANALYSIS; PERSECUTORY DELUSIONS; UPPER ECHELONS; personality; management; perceptions; language; state; expenditures; maintenance

摘要

We develop and test theory regarding the effect of CEO paranoia, defined as stable tendencies toward suspicion, feelings of ill will or resentment, mistrust, and belief in external control or influence, on firm stakeholder engagement. We theorize that because CEOs higher in paranoia have tendencies toward hypervigilance and the biases of self-as-target and sinister attributions they typically avoid engagement with external stakeholders. Further, we argue that CEOs higher in paranoia are subject to paranoid activation when confronted with trait-relevant cues that confirm suspicions of being targeted by a malevolent external entity (here, regulatory rulings or rival attacks), thus eliciting a shift away from avoidance to a more aggressive engagement with those stakeholders. To do so, we develop a content-analytic measure of CEO paranoia following both theory and evidence in psychology and methodological best practices, finding evidence that broadly supports our premise. In total, our study draws attention to how the manifestation of CEO paranoia changes the way CEOs engage stakeholders over time, contributing to understanding in multiple ways.