Capital Share Dynamics When Firms Insure Workers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hartman-Glaser, Barney; Lustig, Hanno; Xiaolan, Mindy Z.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12773
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1707-1751
• 关键词: size distribution; MARKET; INEQUALITY; OWNERSHIP; CONTRACTS; selection; EVOLUTION; stocks

摘要

Although the aggregate capital share of U.S. firms has increased, capital share at the firm-level has decreased. This divergence is due to mega-firms that produce a larger output share without a proportionate increase in labor compensation. We develop a model in which firms insure workers against firm-specific shocks, with more productive firms allocating more rents to shareholders, while less productive firms endogenously exit. Increasing firm-level risk delays exit and increases the measure of mega-firms, raising (lowering) the aggregate (average) capital share. An increase in the level of rents magnifies this effect. We present evidence that supports thismechanism.