Bank Quality, Judicial Efficiency, and Loan Repayment Delays in Italy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schiantarelli, Fabio; Stacchini, Massimiliano; Strahan, Philip E.
• 署名单位: Boston College; IZA Institute Labor Economics; European Central Bank; Bank of Italy; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12896
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2139-2178
• 关键词: BANKRUPTCY REFORM; ENFORCEMENT; determinants; INVESTMENT; OWNERSHIP; CONTRACTS; defaults; COSTS; RISK; firm

摘要

Italian firms delay payment to banks weakened by past loan losses. Exploiting Credit Register data, we fully absorb borrower fundamentals with firm-quarter effects. Identification therefore reflects firm choices to delay payment to some banks, depending on their health. This selective delay occurs more where legal enforcement of collateral recovery is slow. Poor enforcement encourages borrowers not to pay when the value of their bank relationship comes into doubt. Selective delays occur even by firms able to pay all lenders. Credit losses in Italy have thus been worsened by the combination of weak banks and weak legal enforcement.