The Impact of Supervision on Bank Performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hirtle, Beverly; Kovner, Anna; Plosser, Matthew
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12964
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2765-2808
• 关键词: CAMEL RATINGS; MARKET; ORGANIZATION; hierarchies; RISK

摘要

We explore the impact of supervision on the riskiness, profitability, and growth of U.S. banks. Using data on supervisors' time use, we demonstrate that the top-ranked banks by size within a supervisory district receive more attention from supervisors, even after controlling for size, complexity, risk, and other characteristics. Using a matched sample approach, we find that these top-ranked banks that receive more supervisory attention hold less risky loan portfolios, are less volatile, and are less sensitive to industry downturns, but do not have lower growth or profitability. Our results underscore the distinct role of supervision in mitigating banking sector risk.