Access to Collateral and the Democratization of Credit: France's Reform of the Napoleonic Security Code

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aretz, Kevin; Campello, Murillo; Marchica, Maria-Teresa
• 署名单位: University of Manchester; Alliance Manchester Business School; Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12846
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 45-90
• 关键词: Financial constraints; Small business; distance; LAWS; INFORMATION; IMPACT; banks

摘要

France's Ordonnance 2006-346 repudiated the notion of possessory ownership in the Napoleonic Code, easing the pledge of physical assets in a country where credit was highly concentrated. A differences-test strategy shows that firms operating newly pledgeable assets significantly increased their borrowing following the reform. Small, young, and financially constrained businesses benefitted the most, observing improved credit access and real-side outcomes. Start-ups emerged with higher at-inception leverage, located farther from large cities, with more assets-in-place than before. Their exit and bankruptcy rates declined. Spatial analyses show that the reform reached firms in rural areas, reducing credit access inequality across France's countryside.