A Theory of Zombie Lending
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hu, Yunzhi; Varas, Felipe
署名单位：
University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Duke University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1082
DOI：
10.1111/jofi.13022
发表日期：
2021
页码：
1813-1867
关键词：
摘要：
An entrepreneur borrows from a relationship bank or the market. The bank has a higher cost of capital but produces private information over time. While the entrepreneur accumulates reputation as the lending relationship continues, asymmetric information is also developed between the bank/entrepreneur and the market. In this setting, zombie lending is inevitable: Once the entrepreneur becomes sufficiently reputable, the bank will roll over loans even after learning bad news, for the prospect of future market financing. Zombie lending is mitigated when the entrepreneur faces financial constraints. Finally, the bank stops producing information too early if information production is costly.