Intermediation Variety

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Donaldson, Jason Roderick; Piacentino, Giorgia; Thakor, Anjan
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; European Corporate Governance Institute
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13084
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 3103-3152
• 关键词: private equity; moral hazard; risk-taking; lending relationships; Capital requirements; Market equilibrium; Bank debt; credit; COMPETITION; INFORMATION

摘要

We explain why banks and nonbank intermediaries coexist in a model based only on differences in their funding costs. Banks enjoy a low cost of capital due to safety nets and money-like liabilities. We show that this can actually be a disadvantage: it generates a soft-budget-constraint problem that makes it difficult for banks to credibly threaten to withhold additional funding to failed projects. Nonbanks emerge to solve this problem. Their high cost of capital is an advantage: it allows them to commit to terminate funding. Still, nonbanks never take over the entire market, but other coexist with banks in equilibrium.