For Richer, for Poorer: Bankers' Liability and Bank Risk in New England, 1867 to 1880
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Koudijs, Peter; Salisbury, Laura; Sran, Gurpal
署名单位：
Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; York University - Canada; University of Chicago
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1082
DOI：
10.1111/jofi.13011
发表日期：
2021
页码：
1541-1599
关键词：
摘要：
We study whether banks are riskier if managers have less liability. We focus on New England between 1867 and 1880 and consider the introduction of marital property laws that limited liability for newly wedded bankers. We find that banks with managers who married after a law had higher leverage, delayed loss recognition, made more risky and fraudulent loans, and lost more capital and deposits in the Long Depression of 1873 to 1878. These effects were most pronounced for bankers with the largest reduction in liability. We find no evidence that limiting liability increased firm investment at the county level.
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