Regulation of Charlatans in High-Skill Professions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Berk, Jonathan B.; Van Binsbergen, Jules H.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13112
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1219-1258
• 关键词: competition; QUALITY; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT; ECONOMICS; price

摘要

We model a market for a skill in short supply and high demand, where the presence of charlatans (professionals who sell a service they do not deliver on) is an equilibrium outcome. In the model, reducing the number of charlatans through regulation lowers consumer surplus because of the resulting reduction in competition among producers. Producers can benefit from this reduction, potentially explaining the regulation we observe. The effect on total surplus depends on the type of regulation. We derive the factors that drive the cross-sectional variation in charlatans (regulation) across professions.