Resource Allocation in Bank Supervision: Trade-Offs and Outcomes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eisenbach, Thomas M.; Lucca, David O.; Townsend, Robert M.
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13127
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1685-1736
• 关键词: variables; time; RISK

摘要

We estimate a structural model of resource allocation on work hours of Federal Reserve bank supervisors to disentangle how supervisory technology, preferences, and resource constraints impact bank outcomes. We find a significant effect of supervision on bank risk and large technological scale economies with respect to bank size. Consistent with macroprudential objectives, revealed supervisory preferences disproportionately weight larger banks, especially post-2008 when a resource reallocation to larger banks increased risk on average across all banks. Shadow cost estimates show tight resources around the financial crisis and counterfactuals indicate that binding constraints have large effects on the distribution of bank outcomes.