The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoffmann, Florian; Inderst, Roman; Opp, Marcus
• 署名单位: KU Leuven; Goethe University Frankfurt; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13160
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2423-2470
• 关键词: Moral hazard; limited-liability; principal; COMPENSATION; securitization; incentives

摘要

We analyze the effects of regulatory interference in compensation contracts, focusing on recent mandatory deferral and clawback requirements restricting incentive compensation of material risk-takers in the financial sector. Moderate deferral requirements have a robustly positive effect on risk-management effort only if the bank manager's outside option is sufficiently high; otherwise, their effectiveness depends on the dynamics of information arrival. Stringent deferral requirements unambiguously backfire. Our normative analysis characterizes whether and how deferral and clawback requirements should supplement capital regulation as part of the optimal policy mix.