Non-Deal Roadshows, Informed Trading, and Analyst Conflicts of Interest

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bradley, Daniel; Jame, Russell; Williams, Jared
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; University of Florida; University of Kentucky
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13089
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 265-315
• 关键词: PRIVATE MEETINGS; INVESTMENT; performance; management; reputation; forecasts; ORDERS

摘要

Non-deal roadshows (NDRs) are private meetings between management and institutional investors, typically organized by sell-side analysts. We find that around NDRs, local institutional investors trade heavily and profitably, while retail trading is significantly less informed. Analysts who sponsor NDRs issue significantly more optimistic recommendations and target prices, together with more beatable earnings forecasts, consistent with analysts issuing strategically biased forecasts to win NDR business. Our results suggest that NDRs result in a substantial information advantage for institutional investors and create significant conflicts of interests for the analysts who organize them.