Common Ownership Does Not Have Anticompetitive Effects in the Airline Industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dennis, Patrick; Gerardi, Kristopher; Schenone, Carola
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13176
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2765-2798
• 关键词: product-market competition; institutional investors; price dispersion; governance; bankruptcy; entry; POWER

摘要

Institutions often own equity in multiple firms that compete in the same product market. Prior research has shown that these institutional common owners induce anticompetitive pricing behavior in the airline industry. This paper reevaluates this evidence and shows that the documented positive correlation between common ownership and airline ticket prices stems from the market share component of the common ownership measure, and not the ownership and control components. We further show that the results are sensitive to measures of investor control and to assumptions about equity holders' ownership and control during bankruptcy.