Visibility Bias in the Transmission of Consumption Beliefs and Undersaving

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Han, Bing; Hirshleifer, David; Walden, Johan
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of Southern California; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13223
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Pluralistic ignorance; social norms; Conspicuous consumption; retirement plan; alcohol-use; INFORMATION; INEQUALITY; savings; online; PARTICIPATION

摘要

We model visibility bias in the social transmission of consumption behavior. When consumption is more salient than nonconsumption, people perceive that others are consuming heavily, and infer that future prospects are favorable. This increases aggregate consumption in a positive feedback loop. A distinctive implication is that disclosure policy interventions can ameliorate undersaving. In contrast with wealth-signaling models, information asymmetry about wealth reduces overconsumption. The model predicts that saving is influenced by social connectedness, observation biases, and demographic structure, and provides new insight into savings rates. These predictions are distinct from other common models of consumption distortions.