(Why) Do Central Banks Care about Their Profits?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goncharov, Igor; Ioannidou, Vasso; Schmalz, Martin C.
• 署名单位: Lancaster University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13257
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 2991-3045
• 关键词: monetary-policy rules; earnings management; balance-sheet; manipulation; prices; FIRMS

摘要

We document that central banks are discontinuously more likely to report slightly positive profits than slightly negative profits, especially when political pressure is greater, the public is more receptive to extreme political views, and central bank governors are eligible for reappointment. The propensity to report small profits over small losses is correlated with higher inflation and lower interest rates. We conclude that there are agency problems at central banks, which give rise to discontinuous profit incentives that correlate with central banks' policy choices and outcomes. These findings inform the debate about the political economy of central banking and central bank design.