Competition and Misconduct

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Thanassoulis, John
• 署名单位: University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13227
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 2277-2327
• 关键词: pass-through; MARKET; suppression; incentives; ECONOMICS; consumers; emotion; POWER; RISK

摘要

Misconduct is widespread. Practices such as misselling, pump and dump, and money laundering cause harm while raising profits. This paper presents a mechanism that can determine what sorts of misconduct can be sustained in competitive equilibrium in concentrated markets, oligopoly settings, and markets with many small competing firms. The model studied allows general demand and distinguishes types of ethical dilemma using current psychological understanding. The paper shows, for example, that markets with many small competing firms are not vulnerable to misconduct if firms respond to entry with niche strategies or if the ethical dilemma draws an emotional response.