Inside and Outside Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Quigley, Daniel; Walther, Ansgar
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13360
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2667-2714
• 关键词: voluntary disclosure; risk-taking; COMPETITION; opacity

摘要

We study an economy with financial frictions in which a regulator designs a test that reveals outside information about a firm's quality to investors. The firm can also disclose verifiable inside information about its quality. We show that the regulator optimally aims for public speech and private silence, which is achieved with tests that give insiders an incentive to stay quiet. We fully characterize optimal tests by developing tools for Bayesian persuasion with incentive constraints, and use these results to derive novel guidance for the design of bank stress tests, as well as benchmarks for socially optimal corporate credit ratings.