Utility Tokens as a Commitment to Competition
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Goldstein, Itay; Gupta, Deeksha; Sverchkov, Ruslan
署名单位：
University of Pennsylvania; Johns Hopkins University; University of Warwick
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1082
DOI：
10.1111/jofi.13389
发表日期：
2024
页码：
4197-4246
关键词：
摘要：
We show that utility tokens can limit the rent-seeking activities of two-sided platforms with market power while preserving efficiency gains due to network effects. We model platforms where buyers and sellers can meet to exchange services. Tokens serve as the sole medium of exchange on a platform and can be traded in a secondary market. Tokenizing a platform commits a firm to give up monopolistic rents associated with the control of the platform, leading to long-run competitive prices. We show how the threat of entrants can incentivize developers to tokenize and discuss cases where regulation is needed to enforce tokenization.