Auctions with Endogenous Initiation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gorbenko, Alexander S.; Malenko, Andrey
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London; Boston College; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13288
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1353-1403
• 关键词: TAKEOVER; bidder; equilibrium; uniqueness; equity; FIRMS

摘要

We study initiation of takeover auctions by potential buyers and the seller. A bidder's indication of interest reveals that she is optimistic about the target. If bidders' values have a substantial common component, as in takeover battles between financial bidders, this effect disincentivizes bidders from indicating interest, and auctions are seller-initiated. Conversely, in private-value auctions, such as battles between strategic bidders, equilibria can feature both seller- and bidder-initiated auctions, with the likelihood of the latter decreasing in commonality of values and the probability of a forced sale by the seller. We also relate initiation to bids and auction outcomes.