Fee Variation in Private Equity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Begenau, Juliane; Siriwardane, Emil N.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Harvard University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13319
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1199-1247
• 关键词: price-discrimination; search costs; COMPENSATION

摘要

We study how investment fees vary within private equity funds. Net-of-fee return clustering suggests that most funds have two tiers of fees, and we decompose differences across tiers into both management- and performance-based fees. Managers of venture capital funds and those in high demand are less likely to use multiple fee schedules. Some investors consistently pay lower fees relative to others within their funds. Investor size, experience, and past performance explain some but not all of this effect, suggesting that unobserved traits like negotiation skill or bargaining power materially impact the fees that investors pay to access private markets.