Prestige, Promotion, and Pay

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ferreira, Daniel; Nikolowa, Radoslawa
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute; University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13301
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 505-540
• 关键词: job design; law firms; MARKET; COMPETITION; work; RISK; incentives; lawyers; allocation; careers

摘要

We develop a theory in which financial (and other professional services) firms design career structures to sell prestigious jobs to qualified candidates. Firms create less prestigious entry-level jobs, which serve as currency for employees to pay for the right to compete for the more prestigious jobs. In optimal career structures, entry-level employees (associates) compete for better-paid and more prestigious positions (managing directors or partners). The model provides new implications relating job prestige to compensation, employment, competition, and the size of the financial sector.