Crisis Interventions in Corporate Insolvency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Antill, Samuel; Clayton, Christopher
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13421
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 875-910
• 关键词: Financial intermediation; bankruptcy; PROGRAMS; MODEL

摘要

We model the optimal resolution of insolvent firms in general equilibrium. Collateral-constrained banks lend to (i) solvent firms to finance investments and (ii) distressed firms to avoid liquidation. Liquidations create negative fire-sale externalities. Liquidations also relieve bank balance-sheet congestion, enabling new firm loans that generate positive collateral externalities by lowering bank borrowing rates. Socially optimal interventions encourage liquidation when firms have high operating losses, high leverage, or low productivity. Surprisingly, larger fire sales promote interventions encouraging more liquidations. We study synergies between insolvency interventions and macroprudential regulation, bailouts, deferred loss recognition, and debt subordination. Our model elucidates historical crisis interventions.