Worker Runs
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hoffmann, Florian; Vladimirov, Vladimir
署名单位：
KU Leuven; University of Amsterdam; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1082
DOI：
10.1111/jofi.13424
发表日期：
2025
关键词：
摘要：
The voluntary departure of hard-to-replace skilled workers worsens firm prospects, which can lead to additional departures. We develop a model in which firms design compensation to limit the risk of such worker runs. To achieve cost-efficient retention, firms combine fixed wages with dilutable compensation-such as vesting equity or bonus pools-which pays remaining workers more when others leave but gets diluted otherwise. Compensating (identical) workers with differently structured compensation, that is, with a different mix of output-dependent and output-independent pay, can further mitigate the risk of worker runs by ensuring a critical retention level in a cost-efficient way.