Dynamic Banking and the Value of Deposits

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bolton, Patrick; Li, Ye; Wang, Neng; Yang, Jinqiang
• 署名单位: Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Imperial College London; University of London; London Business School; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Shanghai Institute of International Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai Institute of International Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13454
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: consumer switching costs; financial intermediation; capital structure; continuous-time; security design; loan sales; RISK; debt; liquidity; equity

摘要

We propose a theory of banking in which banks cannot perfectly control deposit flows. Facing uninsurable loan and deposit shocks, banks dynamically manage lending, wholesale funding, deposits, and equity. Deposits create value by lowering funding costs. However, when the bank is undercapitalized and at risk of breaching leverage requirements, the marginal value of deposits can turn negative as deposit inflows, by raising leverage, increase the likelihood of costly equity issuance. Banks' inability to fully control leverage distinguishes them from nondepository intermediaries. Our model suggests a reevaluation of leverage regulations and offers new perspectives on banking in a low-interest-rate environment.